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ABSTRACT
The strategic role of the board of directors is gaining renewed research
attention. It may be significantly influenced by the process of selecting
directors and by multiple board memberships (interlocks). A pilot research
project is described in which a series of personal interviews with board
members offers new insights into the board's strategic role.

INTRODUCTION
The role of the board of directors in corporate governance has been
abundantly discussed in the Finance (Burt, 1983, Jensen, 1989, 1991), Economic
(Berle and Means, 1932, Williamson, 1985), Legal (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and,
to a lesser extent, Business Policy and Strategy (Porter, 1980, Vance, 1983)
literature. The hostile takeovers of the 1980s drew increasing attention to
the role of boards, and to the question of whether or not they were diligently
performing what was perceived to be their primary fiduciary responsibility,
namely, overseeing shareholder interests and maximizing shareholder wealth.
There is general agreement that the board has three primary roles -
control, advise/counsel, and strategy (Mace, 1971, Andrews, 1987). The roles
of control and advise/counsel have been widely discussed, but the board's
strategic role has been either completely ignored or mentioned only in
passing.
In addition, although it is widely acknowledged that many directors serve
on more than one board, little attention has been addressed to the strategic
role and impact of directors serving simultaneously on multiple boards, except
from the perspective of their potential for facilitating cooperation between
competing firms (Pfeffer, 1972, Pennings, 1980, Zahra and Pearce, 1987).
"Networks" and "networking" will be generally be utilized in this paper, when
referring to multiple-board service, rather than the somewhat questionable
term "interlocking directorships".
A profusion of literature on the corporate governance process (Berle and
Means, 1932, Burt, 1983, Williamson, 1985) and on boards of directors (Mace,
1971, Vance, 1983, Andrews, 1987) examines in great detail how boards are
supposed to work, but provides very little information on how board processes
actually function. To help illuminate this area a pilot study was designed to
explore board processes from the perspective of those who actually serve on
boards
.
A diagram depicting important elements in the board configuration process
is provided to serve as a frame of reference. It is intended to illustrate
cause-and-ef fect relationships between important input variables and the
director-selection process, and between the director-selection process and
corporate outputs, notably those indicative of performance.
Insert Figure 1 about here
This paper first reviews the literature and examines research issues,
then describes and discusses the findings of the research study. This is
followed by a summary of findings and implications for further study.
LITERATURE REVIEW
This section highlights the literature that appears most relevant to
director selection, director networking, and the strategic role of the board.
A summary in tabular form is presented in the first column of Table 1.
Insert Table 1 about here
Boards of Directors. Mace (1971) lists three generally-accepted roles of the
board, namely, asking discerning questions, selecting the president, and
establishing basic objectives, corporate strategies, and board policies for
the firm. Implicit in these roles are the tasks of advising, monitoring, and
evaluating the performance of top management, in its pursuit of corporate
objectives. Andrews (1987) suggests that the central function of a working
board includes reviewing management's formulation and implementation of
strategy, assuring adherence to established objectives and policy, and
contributing constructively to management's recommendation for change.
Most boards consist of both inside directors (corporate executives) and
outside directors (non-employees of the corporation). Insiders are viewed as
being selected for their availability to answer questions in their areas of
expertise (a comfort-zone for the CEO) (Mace, 1971) or, as Baysinger and
Hoskisson (1990) suggest, in an attempt to improve the control of decisions,
by overcoming problems of information processing.
Selection of outside directors is heavily weighted in favor of those with
position and title as leaders in their field. Eaton (1990) notes that the
favorite choice of CEOs is other CEOs, and that at least 80% of all directors
are themselves chief executives of other companies.
Mace (1971) addresses what he sees as the general ineffectiveness of
boards in performing their primary roles: asking discerning questions - most
board members feel these types of questions should never be asked at board
meetings (reasons given include "corporate manners", "professional courtesy",
and not wanting to look like idiots, due to information asymmetry); selecting
the president - apparently only occurs in crisis situations ("...the only real
decision-making job the board has, the rest is all 'fluff'"), otherwise the
CEO almost always chooses his/her successor; establishing basic objectives,
corporate strategies, and board policies - most boards do not perform these
functions, nor are they even involved in them.
Outside directors are generally perceived as more independent than
insiders, but in many boardrooms it is assumed that even the independent
(outside) directors will support the CEO until it is necessary to remove
him/her (Andrews, 1987). Andrews argues that this attitude of reluctance to
fire is compounded by the fact that these outside directors owe their board
membership to the CEO. In other words, selection of directors by a CEO, whose
favorite choice of outside directors is other CEOs, can lead to a board that
is "reluctant to rock a captain of industry's boat lest their own ships get
swamped in return" (Eaton, 1990).
In any event, it seems the intentions of the person or group responsible
for selecting directors may have more to do with how the board is utilized
than whether directors are from inside or outside, or whether they are active
or inactive. Since directors are most often selected by the CEO,
Andrews '( 1987 ) observation perhaps sums it up best: "The caliber and strategic
usefulness of a board of directors will nontheless remain the option of the
chief executives, who usually determine its function. How much they use their
boards for improving the quality of corporate strategy and planning turns, as
usual, on the sincerity of their interest and skill".
Director Networks. Pfeffer (1972) portrays boards as mechanisms through which
firms coopt important external organizations on which they are dependent.
Zahra and Pearce (1989) suggest, in fact, that this resource dependence
perspective of the organization emerged from research on interlocks.
Interlocking directorates link companies in essentially three ways:
ownership, in which two organizations are jointly controlled by one board;
direct interlocks, in which two organizations share one or more board members;
and indirect interlocks, in which directors of two firms both serve, for
example, on a third firm's board. Other examples of indirect interlocks
include third-party financial institutions serving as brokers between two
organizations; or members of two different boards who are associated through
mutual professional interests or social activities (e.g., private club
memberships )
.
Burt (1983) describes interlocks as increasing the organization's ability
to improve access to competitive information, through identifying advantageous
trade partners; analyzing risks of trade partners as suppliers or consumers;
predicting future developments; and anticipating responses to potential
price/product changes.
Researchers view interlocks as mutually-beneficial interorganizational
relationships, with the advantages of, inter alia, increased
interorganizational coordination; reduced transaction costs; access to vital
information and resources; horizontal coordination among firms along the same
value chain; vertical coordination among firms and their suppliers and
customers; enhanced corporate reputation; and enhanced status in the business
community (Zahra and Pearce 1989). The overall result of these advantages is
reduced uncertainty. Schoorman, Bazerman and Atkin (1981) add experience and
expertise gained from parallel experience to the list of factors that reduce
environmental uncertainty.
Pennings (1980) suggests that multiple directorships increase the power
of both the individual and the firm that (s)he represents, since multiple
interlocks may represent multiple accesses to resources and information.
Pennings emphasizes that the most important question regarding interlocks is
that of linkage direction; that is, by whom is the director employed, and who
initiated the interlock?
The Strategic Role of the Board. "Strategic management comes to its
culmination in the chairmanship of effective boards." (Andrews, 1987). Zahra
and Pearce (1989) describe the strategic role of boards (which they say is in
its infancy as a topic of study) as boundary-spanners, with access to
information vital to diagnosis of opportunities and threats. Pennings (1980)
suggests that organizations use interlocking directorates, among other
mechanisms, to actively manipulate their environments to assure a continuing
supply of resources. In somewhat the same vein, Baysinger and Hoskisson
(1990) see board composition possibly having important strategic implications.
Kanter (1989) sets the stage for an even broader role, visualizing the
"corporation as a switchboard", in which the firm acts as a central
information center and command point for a network of other organizations.
This brief overview of selected portions of the literature is intended
more to emphasize areas that have not been illuminated by previous research
than to elaborate on those that have been. What boards are supposed to do and
what they actually do are both discussed from a variety of perspectives but,
almost without exception, the analyses are based on secondary data rather than
from any inside perspective. The gap between theory and reality is even more
noticeable in the director selection process, about which much has been
written, but virtually none of it is from the inside perspective of how the
process of director selection really operates. Director networks are
frequently discussed from such perspectives as their potential for
facilitating cooperation between competing firms (Burt, 1983, Zahra and
Pearce, 1989), and for assuring access to critical resources (Pfeffer, 1972,
Pennings, 1980), but almost never regarding their role in director selection.
With reference to Figure 1, the areas labeled "Board's Role", "Director
Selection", and "Director Networks" have been almost entirely ignored by
research, or examined in a relatively cursory manner, relying principally on
secondary data.
RESEARCH ISSUES
Although the literature review tends to confirm prior impressions that
board networks may play a significant role in some board actions, it doesn't
shed much light on the more strategic types of board involvement. This,
therefore, leads to a focus on the overriding question "What roles do director
networks play in board actions?" Since this is a question unlikely to be
adequately answered by secondary data, a pilot study of directors seemed a
logical means of gathering first-hand information.
Rather than pre-empting their impressions, it seemed important to learn,
from directors' perspectives, what they think are the most important board
issues. Accordingly personal interviews were conducted with a sample of 18
directors who serve, or have recently served, on the boards of for-profit
companies
.
With the intention of gaining entry to at least six boards, each in a
different industry, ten directors were initially contacted through
introductory letters, resulting in nine interviews. The initial interviews
ultimately led to nine additional interviews, with members of those same
boards. Interviews were more ethnographic (Spradley, 1979) than focused,
utilizing only selected open-ended questions, and then only when necessary to
stimulate conversation, rather than to seek answers. Although finding answers
to specific questions was desirable, the research intent was to let the
interviewees describe their culture, and take the conversation into areas they
feel are important rather than those felt important by the researcher. In
this context the research study hoped to not just find answers, but perhaps
also to identify other important questions that may not have been previously
considered in the literature.
The directors interviewed speak from the combined experience of 55
directorships (32 current and 23 former), on 46 boards (23 current and 23
former) of for-profit organizations. Their firms cover a broad spectrum of
sizes - from a few million dollars in annual revenue to several billion - and
industries, including manufacturing, communications, utilities, banking,
education, transportation, healthcare, insurance, and construction. Both
public and private companies are represented.
Although, or perhaps because, the subject of multiple board memberships has
been the object of a large volume of research, the list of questions without
answers is long and provocative. So much so that, for purposes of this
project, the research was designed to illuminate the following areas which
were felt to be most significant in examining the strategic role of boards:
board responsibilities, composition, selection, reasons for accepting
directorships, director networks, and the role of the board chairman. The key
research questions are reviewed in Table 2.
Insert Table 2 about here
Although the list in Table 2 is far from exhaustive, it adds the study of
new issues, beyond those of previous research, in order to more closely focus
and target the direction of future research.
This research was designed around the principle of ethnography, which is
defined as "the work of describing a culture" (Spradley, 1979:30). As such,
an interview would ideally involve the subject describing a particular culture
entirely from his/her individual perspective, largely without being influenced
by the interviewer. Since, in this case, the subjects were being interviewed
to learn about their roles as directors, the desired culture was that of
boards of directors. The list of key research questions (Table 2) was
intended to be utilized in a contingency mode, to be asked only if time
permitted after the interviewee felt ( s ) he had discussed everything relevant
to the subject. From this perspective, all areas of Figure 1 were open to
discussion, depending on the interviewees' perceptions of the issues that
seemed most important, or interesting, to individual board members.
As it happened, some interviewees, perhaps concerned that they would not
discuss the things the researcher deemed important, requested questions to
which they could respond. Usually a single non-specific question was
sufficient to trigger a substantial amount of dialogue, and it seldom took
more than one or two questions to elicit an hour or more of discussion.
Although there was never sufficient time to ask the full list of questions,
most, if not all, were usually spontaneously answered during the course of the
interview.
Since the detailed results of this survey, conducted during mid-1992, are
much too comprehensive to be addressed in their entirety in this paper, the
findings have been condensed here, for readers' convenience, to those
associated with director selection, director networks, and the strategic role
of the board. The three columns of Table 1 provide a framework for linking
research issues with the literature review, and survey findings with research
issues
.
OBSERVATIONS
Although the sample survey results described focus primarily on director
selection and director networks, two additional issues that seem significant
to the strategic role of boards - responsibilities and composition - are also
briefly addressed.
Selection
How are directors selected?; Who is responsible for selection?; What are
the selection criteria?; How are candidates identified?; To what extent do
corporate strategies influence the selection process?; To what extent do
memberships on other boards influence selection?
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Although selection is, in most cases, clearly the responsibility of the
CEO/Chairman, in those situations where the Chairman is an outside director
rather than the CEO the issue is somewhat hazier: sometimes the Chairman
selects the directors; in one case the CEO selected them, including an outside
Chairman; and in another a director who is also the majority owner of the firm
selected the directors and appointed an outside director as the Chairman. One
director suggested that the board, itself, should not only select directors,
but the Chairman as well.
Selection Criteria. Recruiting directors appears, in most cases, to start
with rather subjective requirements such as compatibility with existing board
members, collegiality , high visibility, business success, good background,
insightfulness, character, integrity, and image. Of these somewhat vague
criteria, compatibility was repeatedly mentioned first, and seems to stand out
among these directors' most important concerns. More objective and measureable
criteria, such as balancing the mix of institutions, geographic areas,
experience, constituencies, expertise, ages, business backgrounds, contacts,
and leadership strengths seemed of secondary importance.
The perceived importance of compatibility of directors and board cohesion
appear to support a prevailing feeling among participants that teamwork is a
key to board effectiveness, and that it is not in a firm's best interests for
its board to be adversarial.
Identification of Candidates. Those interviewed insist that director
selection is one of the most critical issues facing boards, and a process that
is changing, from cronyism and good-old-boy networks to expertise-based
selection. Yet, the only examples offered of directors recruited on the open
market (e.g., using search firms) were two who were selected to be the first
women on their respective boards. Otherwise, identification of candidates
appears to be almost exclusively through directors' personal, professional,
and social networks, with board nominating committees relying almost totally
11
on the recommendations of current board members.
Some chairmen emphasize the value of keeping a list of people with whom
they are familiar - people they know they can work with, and who will maintain
the collegiality that is so important - as prospects for future board seats.
Most boards want the top people from other companies on their boards, for
their leadership, knowledge, and independence. Since there is often great
demand for these individuals, and a practical limit to the number of board
invitations one person can accept, a common selection strategy, particularly
for larger companies, is picking tommorrow's "comers". This means, in effect,
gambling on which second-tier person in another company is most likely to be
that firm's next CEO. Offering a directorship to the heir-apparent may thus be
an attractive alternative when a desired high-profile CEO is over-solicited
for board memberships.
One director describes the selection process as similar to asking "Who do
we marry ? Do we start out looking for a particular person, or do we bump into
somebody in our experiences ? We don't start out looking for a certain height,
weight, etc., but are introduced to somebody and ultimately these things lead
to a more meaningful relationship". This may aptly summarize the past and, in
many companies, current, state-of-the-art in director selection.
Accepting Directorships. The number of boards on which the directors in our
sample currently serve (including their own) ranges from a minimum of 1 to a
maximum of 4, with an average of approximately 1 3/4. Most describe 3 as the
maximum number of outside directorships to which they could do justice without
diminishing the returns to their own business. With that in mind, many
directors have more directorship invitations than they can possibly accept,
which allows them to be more selective as to which board invitations they will
accept. One director, for example, confided that 2 or 3 companies have told
him "when you are ready, we would like you to come on the board". In such
cases, what are the criteria by which candidates determine which board
invitations to accept ?
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Those interviewed list several acceptance criteria, with the opportunity to
learn from other companies, industries, and board members mentioned most
frequently, followed closely by the importance of a feeling of having
something to contribute. Other reasons include the opportunity to gain
experience that can help in one's own business; networking opportunities;
honor/prestige (for some, though now somewhat offset by increasing liability);
the opportunity to work with a particular kind of management group or a
particular type of board; a good extension of a business career; and the
opportunity for candid peer relationships (particularly for CEOs, who often
find it lonely at the top)
.
Also emphasized were the importance of feeling that the company and its
management are honest; that one will be treated as an independent and will
feel comfortable saying "I vote no"; comments will be received constructively,
and valued; directors will have a real say; and that the board operates as a
team.
The most important factor in acceptance or rejection decisions can,
perhaps, be best described under the rubric of the risk- return ratio - what
are the potential benefits to the director and his/her company, and what is
the likely cost ? Aside from the previously-discussed diminishing returns to
one's own firm from serving on too many boards, the amount of time involved in
being a director can be a critical constraint in other ways. As one director
describes it "In this day of being a diligent director, you can find yourself
in certain committee assignments, or in a frequency of meetings that is hard
to digest, in terms of your own schedule". As a result, directorship
candidates tend to avoid those boards which may involve an inordinate amount
of time, and potential liability. This means that boards of troubled companies
are likely to have more difficulty attracting directors, since crises not only
involve increased liability, but also require board members to be more active,
and spend more time than they may have originally intended. In addition, being
identified with a relatively unsuccessful company goes against the grain of a
director's personal pride, and may be a blight on his track record. In other
13
words, most directors would much rather be associated with a successful
company than a troubled one, from standpoints of time, liability, and
reputation.
Additional influences in the rejection of directorships may be government
regulation - the illegality of serving on the board of a competitor - or
donor-company policies limiting the boards on which their officers may serve
(e.g., no very large customers, influential suppliers, banks, or financial
institutions )
.
Overall, recruiting board members is becoming more of a challenge, as fewer
people feel the benefits outweigh the liabilities, and the degree of
difficulty is likely to be inversely correlated with the relative success of
the company.
With reference to liability risk, one director guestions why anybody in
their right mind would agree to serve as a director unless they had
substantial ownership interests in the company.
Director Networks
What are the implications, for directors, and their boards, of serving on
more than one board?; to what extent do multiple board memberships play a role
in key strategic decisions?
Other than one director's observation that the opportunities for
networking (which he referred to as a "business socialization process") are a
key reason for accepting directorships, the role of multiple board memberships
was never addressed directly. Its influence was, however, ubiguitous
throughout the interviews, particularly in the processes of identification and
selection of directors. In fact it seems that networking may be such a
pervasive and long-standing part of board processes that it may have become
more of a norm than a conscious strategy - unconscious, and nearly invisible.
This is perhaps due in part to the fact that networks are more freguently
utilized in ways, and for purposes, that are not usually considered part of
corporate strategy. This is evident in descriptions of specific situations in
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which individual directors, through their networks, were able to benefit their
firms more by the good fortune of having contacts which later became useful
than because they were deliberately selected for their ability to utilize
these contacts. In other words, the directors were not strategically selected
because of their networking potential, but were able to utilize their networks
to the advantage of the firm that had selected them - perhaps analogous to
i
what Mintzberg (1978) describes as an emergent strategy .
And this process may work both ways. Just as a board may not select
directors because of their specific networking potential, executives may
often accept directorships with no particular strategy for which boards they
hope to join. In fact, one director suggested, and this was implicit in the
reasons several other directors offered for accepting board seats, that
director-candidates should not be too selective in turning down their first
board invitation. Acceptance may be the key not only to board experience, but
also to greater networking opportunities, and to additional directorships.
Additional impetus to the pervasiveness of director networks is provided by
CEOs suggesting their top executives as substitutes for the board seats they
themselves are unable to accept. Primary benefits of company executives
serving on outside boards include building alliances with, and learning more
about, other industries or capabilities that are important to the success of
their company. For example, an executive of an automobile manufacturer
serving on the board of a petroleum company can be beneficial to the latter 's
understanding of what is important to the former, and vice versa. Another
benefit, particularly to companies headquartered in more remote locations, is
the opportunity to remain in the mainstream of information and technology.
This can be accomplished not only by a firm's executives serving on other
boards, but also by inviting executives from more cosmopolitan areas to serve
on a local firm's board. This may be an especially effective strategy for
Mintzberg suggests that a strategy is more than what a firm intends to do;
it also includes what the firm actually does. A firm's total strategy is, then,
the product of whatever intended strategies are actually realized and any
(unplanned) strategies that emerge.
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linking subsidiary boards with their corporate mainstreams. Maintaining
community ties is suggested as an important board responsibility, particularly
for banks and utility companies, freguently accomplished through board
memberships.
Overall, it is apparent that director networking plays a dominant role in
the identification and selection of directors. Virtually all directors
interviewed, and most others to whom they referred, were offered board seats
through networking rather than through the recruiting channels that would be
considered primary in the selection of corporate executives. Networks most
frequently mentioned included school ties, family ties, social contacts,
professional associations, personal acquaintances, and board memberships.
Responsibilities
Since the roles of the board as a unit and the directors as individuals
involve responsibilities and perceptions at two different levels, it will be
more informative to analyze them as separate sub-categories.
Board. Maximizing shareholder wealth is mentioned first by virtually every
director as the primary responsibility of the board. Although only one
director specifically amends that responsibility by adding "over the long-
term", the context in which it is discussed by most directors implied that
philosophy. By the same token, the emphasis by two directors (both from the
same board) on the importance of balancing the interests of four stakeholder
groups - shareholders, customers, community, and employees - is implicit in
the discussions of several of the others interviewed. Other board
responsibilities most frequently mentioned are listed in Table 3 (in order of
the frequency with which they were mentioned)
.
Insert Table 3 about here
Although the emphasis on the importance of these perceived responsibilities
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varied considerably, to the extent that some seem contradictory, most can be
subsumed under the heading of "maximizing shareholder wealth", and necessary,
though not sufficient, to that end.
Individual Directors. There appears to be more consensus on the
responsibilities of the individual director than on those of the board, with
general agreement that a director's first responsibility is to learn enough
about the corporation to be a useful and effective participant in board
discussions, as quickly as possible. Next, although it seems intuitive, most
feel a director should bring something to the board - business experience,
outside perspective, individual competences - in other words, be able to make
a contribution. Perhaps the counter-intuitiveness of having to even suggest
something that seems so obvious is an indication of the relative inactivity of
some board members, either of their own volition or because they are expected
to be passive rather than active. This is hinted at in the common observation
that a director's responsibilities include an expectation to behave in certain
ways, and one observation that a director's responsibility is to "fit in".
Other perspectives were quite the opposite, seeing as primary responsibilities
accepting a directorship for the right reasons, and exercising sound judgement
in weighty matters.
Other responsibilities include keeping current on the company's products,
services, markets, and competition. As one director put it, the most
difficult part of being a director is knowing enough about the nuances of the
company and its industry to be useful. This may explain why directors'
perceptions. of how long it takes to become effective as board members range
from less than a year to as long as six years, depending on the complexity of
the organization and how different it is from their previous experience.
Another responsibility is mentioned in two different contexts: one, that
individual directors have an obligation to be loyal to the chairman, or resign
from the board; the other that, if management is resistant to change,
directors should resign, and state why. A final admonition, openly stated by
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some directors, but implicit in the discussions of most, is a director's
responsibility not to be a "rubber stamp" - to speak up, and ask questions,
particularly "what are you doing ?" and "why ?" and, if (s)he doesn't
understand an issue, to not be afraid to abstain from voting.
Board Composition
The opinion is strongly-stated, and near-unanimous, that boards should be
heavily weighted with outside directors, with the only apparent non-consensus
surrounding how many inside directors, and who they should be. Although the
numbers suggested range from none to several, most feel it should be between
one and three, depending on the board's perception of the benefits of officers
also serving as directors. If one insider, it should be the CEO; if two, the
CEO and the President; if three, the CEO, the President, and either the CFO,
or an heir-apparent. At one end of the spectrum of opinions is the perception
that any management people at all on the board will diminish the degree of
tension between the board and management that is necessary to objectivity. At
the other extreme is the perception that limiting the number of inside
directors may place too severe a limitation on the basis of , fact and opinion
on which outside directors make decisions. This is the view that the presence
of inside directors gives comfort to the outside directors that the entire
inside input does not come from just one source. A supporting view is that it
would be grossly unfair to the next CEO not to have had board experience.
Opinions on inside directorships as a means of grooming successors are both
supportive and opposed, with the latter position justified by the
observations: one doesn't have to be a (voting) board member to get board
experience; the board's role is to provide policy direction, not day to day
management; and the greater the presence of insiders, the greater the tendency
of the board to micro-manage.
Although those representing closely-held, majority-owned, or private
companies do not attach the same importance to having a majority of outside
directors on their boards (less possibility for separation between ownership
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and control), most have, in recent years, added outsiders for a variety of
reasons, including increasing board activity/involvement, broadening the
firm's perspective, and adding new business skills.
DISCUSSION
Other issues were emphasized by those interviewed as major board
concerns. Some of these may be generalizable while others are more company-
or board-specific.
Micro-management. A tendency for directors to become too deeply involved in
what may be best described as operational (vs. strategic) issues, is a
continuing challenge. This is particularly evident in personnel and
compensation matters, which may be largely attributable to the difficulty of
keeping personalities out of decisions involving individual characteristics
and performance.
Involvement. Most directors in this sample, once they have agreed to serve on
a board, want and expect to be actively involved. Several specifically mention
a desire to know more about, and be more involved in, corporate strategy
formulation. Those who made mention of this appear to be on boards of
companies whose strategies are currently formulated internally, then passed on
to the board for comment and ratification.
Retirement. How long should CEOs and other inside directors remain on the
board after retirement ? The policies and ages currently vary from company to
company, ranging from age 65 to 72. Some boards see advantages ("living
history") and others disadvantages (an intimidating influence on successors)
to keeping retired directors on the board. It appears that retired executives
may offer a board the added advantage of an insider's knowledge of the
company/ industry, but more objectivity and independence, with respect to
management, than they had before retirement. The retirement issue does,
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however, appear to be one of those cases in which CEO-duality may be perceived
as an opportunity to be self-serving.
Management Succession. Although most directors interviewed list "assuring
management succession" as a primary board responsibility, one portrays the
issue as "overblown". He feels it may have been justifiably important 10 or 20
years ago, when businesses were more autonomous and self-sufficient, but not
anymore. Companies can't afford to "stockpile" talent and still be
competitive. And, in any event, key people will not wait indefinitely for
promotion - those with mobility will leave. However, this director feels there
is no lack of good talent out there, it just takes effort to locate it.
Following are a number of issues that, although not stressed by directors
during their individual interviews, seem, from an overview of the entire
sample, to have important implications for boards and directors. To varying
degrees these perspectives may echo, augment, or contradict some of those
previously discussed but, more often, they will either view some of the same
issues from different perspectives or focus on different issues altogether.
Networking. Individual networking was one of the least directly-addressed of
the issues discussed. Yet, networking appears to be one of the most
pervasive, and perhaps most influential, forces at work in and among directors
and the boards on which they serve. Although most evident, and currently
probably most influential, in non-strategic applications, the potential of
networking in strategic applications appears to be significant. Davis (1991)
offers an example, portraying a director interlock system which acts as a
diffusion mechanism for information and strategies. He supports the existence
of such a network through an empirical analysis of the diffusion of the
adoption of poison-pill amendments among U.S. corporations.
Selection. Selection of directors is the most obvious means through which
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networking is currently influential, and is possibly also one of the areas
with the most strategic potential.
Involvement. Evolution of board structure and composition, from comparatively
uninvolved/inactive boards toward more involved/assertive boards, appears to
have been on the increase in recent years. This is particularly noticeable in
privately-owned companies which have added outside directors to their boards.
This possibly represents a changing attitude: that successful businesses,
public and private, cannot compete successfully in isolation - they
increasingly need outside inputs to maintain corporate viability. This is
perhaps induced by such forces as increasing government involvement, increased
competitiveness, increased complexity, expansion and globalization of markets,
and information-processing needs.
In the United States an increased awareness of, and interest in,
corporate governance is exemplified by the active involvement of institutional
investors in analyzing board performance as well as corporate performance.
CALPERS (California Public Employees' Retirement System), the largest
institutional fund in this country with investments exceeding 70 billion
dollars, is a leader in what has been termed the "political" (Pound, 1992) or
"democratic" model of corporate governance (Pound, 1993). This model involves
"relationship investing", in which large investors become actively involved in
two-way communication with the CEOs and boards of the corporations in which
they take ownership positions. By seeking "...friendly, ongoing conversations
with management and the board about corporate policy and the makeup of the
board of directors" institutional investors can "...provide corporations with
a reliable and friendly focal point in the market from whom to receive
feedback" (Pound, 1993). Increasing interest in this approach is evident in
its current popularity as a topic of discussion in business publications.
In the United Kingdom the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate
Governance (the Cadbury committee) was commissioned, by the Financial
Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange, and the accountancy profession,
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to address the financial aspects of corporate governance (Cadbury, 1992).
This was due to a low level of confidence in financial reporting, and lack of
adequate auditing safeguards.
Overall, the trend toward more active boards may be recognition that no
matter how self-contained a business may seem, it can only live in isolation
until the environment around it changes, and when that happens it is affected,
whether or not its board chooses to recognize the fact.
Although it is inherent in the responsibilities of a board that it be
actively involved in overseeing the effectiveness of the company, the actual
degree of involvement of any board is seen by this sample of directors as a
function of how active their chairman wants them to be. It is also apparent
from their comments that the chairmen of the boards represented by these
directors are overwhelmingly in favor of active boards, and that several have
consciously added directors and changed board procedures to encourage greater
involvement. Their feelings may have been voiced by one chairman's comment to
the effect that, if you look at all the talent represented around the board
room, "who in their right mind wouldn't want to have some advice from them ?".
This attitude seems prevalent in our sample, in which several of the boards
represented have taken deliberate measures in recent years to evolve from CEO-
or chairman- domination to actively promoting more involvement in corporate
issues (as opposed to micro-issues).
These interviews reveal descriptions of boards that became active only
after a crisis began threatening the survival of the company, but then
performed admirably. Yet it is also evident that the directors interviewed, to
a person, want to be actively involved in the boards on which they serve, and
in some cases mention their desire to be even more actively involved than they
currently are. As previously mentioned, involvement may, to a large extent, be
a function of the amount, quality, and timeliness of the information provided
to board members. In fact keeping the directors well informed may be the
chairman's most effective means of communicating a genuine desire for the
board to be actively involved in the company.
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Involvement of the board can be a function of the chairman's proactivity in
keeping them active, or because of any number of crisis-induced situations,
including: negative corporate performance, in which case board activity may be
motivated more by the directors' desire to protect both their reputation and
their personal assets (against liability); or a negative economy, which often
provides many of the same inducements.
Also mentioned as important to involvement were: board size - the smaller
the more involved; and boardroom layout and table arrangement - which may
either enhance or inhibit participation. Yet, overall, the impression left by
these interviews is that the primary keys to board involvement are whether or
not, and to what degree, the chairman wants the board involved, and the
information provided to board members.
Board Tenure. An interesting aspect of the appointment of directors is the
apparent permanence of board seats. Asking a director to step down appears to
be a rare occurrence. This, in effect, takes away a large degree of the
board's discretion as far as board composition is concerned. When it becomes
apparent that a director was a bad choice, boards commonly choose
to live with their decision, even though it may mean living with it until the
director reaches retirement age. This was given as the reason candidates who
are younger than their early to middle 50s should not be considered for board
seats - if you make a mistake you will have to live with it too long. How then
can, as one director suggested, the mix of board members depend on the
company's immediate situation ? Although it is clear that board composition
may need to change as a firm's situation changes, just how "immediately" can
the composition of a board with what seems to equate to lifetime tenure be
changed ? And, considering the difficulty of spotting the beginning of
problems in any company, but especially in one that has been traditionally
successful, how effectively can a tenured board - one whose directors are
insulated from the prospect of dismissal - be expected to execute its
fiduciary responsibility of protecting the interests of the owners?
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SUMMARY
As increased corporate complexity has led to dramatic increases in
delegation and decentralization, the role of the board of directors has become
increasingly complex. Yet, although board structure, composition, selection,
and utilization have changed to some degree, it appears to have been more
often due to reaction than by design, and frequently in response to crisis.
Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret (1976) describe a continuum of stimuli
that evoke decisions, ranging from opportunity decisions at one extreme to
crisis decisions at the other. Opportunity decisions are described as those
initiated on a purely voluntary basis, to improve an already secure position.
Crisis decisions are made when organizations respond to intense pressures.
Significant changes in boards of directors seem to be made much more
frequently in response to intense pressures than to capitalize on
opportunities. This has, no doubt, contributed substantially to the perceived
ineffectiveness of boards in general. Calls for revitalization of the board
as the overseer of corporate responsibility have, however, seldom been
accompanied by realistic suggestions of how this might be effectively
accomplished in today's environment.
Although it seems elementary that we cannot expect boards to operate
effectively today using the same structure and procedures that were effective
50, or even 20 years ago, there appears to have been little real change. For
example, as outlined in Table 1., most directors, particularly outside
directors, still seem to be selected for their general knowledge rather than
for specific capabilities needed by the firm. Yet how many corporate executive
teams are made up of generalists ? Most appear to be predominantly staffed by
specialists - experts in relatively limited areas of expertise.
Why, then, aren't individual directors selected for the particular unique
contributions they can make toward specific corporate needs, based on their
individual distinctive competences? This would seem to offer significantly
more to board effectiveness than selection of directors based primarily on
reputation, stature, social relationships, or other currently-dominant
24
criteria.
The implications for improving the quality of corporate strategy offer even
more potential for multinational corporations than for domestic firms. Aldrich
and Herker (1981) discuss the extent to which "boundary roles" can influence
the degree of organizational autonomy through information processing.
Information from external sources enters the organization through boundary
roles, and through external representation, in which boundary roles link the
organizational structure to environmental elements, by buffering, moderating,
and/or influencing the environment. They view the environment as information
available to the organization through search and exposure, and boundary role
occupants as those who are exposed to large amounts of potentially-relevant
information.
The optimal board of any large firm might then consist of the minimum
number of inside directors necessary to allow integration of strategic
internal and external information, and a majority of carefully-chosen outside
directors, selected for their potential as boundary-spanners in particular
areas of environmental uncertainty. Their strategic inputs may come from their
own knowledge, or from their potential to network with local governments,
regulatory agencies, other companies, suppliers, customers, stockholders,
employees, or any other of a firm's stakeholders. Boards configured by these
means might be appropriately categorized as strategic boards - those whose
primary role includes active involvement in evaluating top management
performance and in analyzing corporate strategy, as well as advising and
counseling top management. Traditional boards, on the other hand, are those
whose primary role is perceived as advising and counseling top management.
As depicted in Figure 1, director selection is potentially one of the key
determinants of a board's independence, and in its degree of involvement. An
independent, involved board is likely to engage in a higher degree of
dialectic discussion, leading to inputs to corporate strategy that represent a
broader range of perspectives and a wider variety of alternatives. The
resulting corporate strategy is likely to be superior to strategy based on
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narrower perspectives and should, in turn, contribute more positively to
corporate performance.
Although the original responsibility of the board of directors - assuring
maximization of shareholder wealth - remains a primary concern, it has long
since ceased being the only concern. Corporate social responsibility in its
many forms is now a central issue and becomes more so as a firm grows, thus
affecting more constituencies. To ignore the social and cultural effects of
its actions jeopardizes not only a firm's profitability but possibly even its
survival. The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), for example, has had a major
influence on the banking industry in the U.S., by monitoring and controlling
how and to whom banks make real estate loans. Multinational corporations are
even more vulnerable than domestic firms to the social responsibility concerns
of the countries in which they do business.
Strategic selection of directors has, therefore, the potential to make the
board of directors a significant force in reducing organizational uncertainty
for corporations. The boundary-spanning potential of this heretofore
underutilized resource has dramatic strategic implications, which may well
make the difference between success and failure of corporations, particularly
in the global arena.
Metcalfe (1981) suggests a perspective that illustrates the importance of
boundary spanning: viewing organizational environments as consisting mainly of
networks of other organizations, in which it is unclear where the organization
ends and the environment begins. Viewed in this perspective, how can
organizations which hope to survive and prosper realistically expect to do so
without taking a holistic view of their role in not only the business world
but in society as well ?
This paper, in examining board processes, through personal interviews as
well as literature review, argues that the composition of boards of directors
has not changed to keep pace with the increasing complexity and the increasing
need for strategic flexibility in the corporations they are charged with
monitoring and controlling. A tenure system, in which appointment to a board
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often amounts to a lifetime membership regardless of performance, coupled with
a director selection process driven largely by personal or professional
networks, has led to boards that tend to be permanent, complacent, and
ingrown. Although the responsibilities of the board have become much broader
due to increased concern for corporate social responsibility and globalization
of business, selection of directors has not kept pace, continuing to be based
primarily on the principles of collegiality and compatibility, rather than the
specific expertise needed to guide the corporation. In the future,
organizational prosperity, and perhaps survival, will become even more
dependent upon the organization's ability to reduce uncertainty by effective
boundary spanning. The quality of organizational boundary spanning can be
maximized by selecting directors based on the expertise needed to complement
corporate strategy, and by the quality of information provided to and by the
board of directors.
IMPLICATIONS
This project, as might be expected of one designed more to seek questions
than answers, suggests tentative answers to a few questions, while raising
many more. Yet it serves several important purposes, including: opening the
door to the boardroom a bit further; learning what directors think are the
important issues; learning more about the process of director selection and
retention; and, perhaps most important, shedding more light on director
networks - their pervasiveness, how they work, how they are utilized, and how
they may be more strategically utilized.
One finding that was particularly interesting, though perhaps from a firm-
heterogeneity perspective it should have been intuitive, is that boards may be
as heterogeneous as the firms they govern. In fact, if they are to govern
effectively it seems logical that boards should be tailored to their
individual firms, at least as far as the capabilities they represent. In other
words, boards should be more like their own firms than like other boards. Yet,
in some ways, such as composition, structure, and particularly director
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selection, boards seem to be more alike than they are different.
A number of questions arising from or spotlighted by this research may
have significant implications, not only for boards of directors, but also for
corporate executives and the various stakeholders they represent. Some of the
more prominant examples of such questions are described below, each followed
by a brief elaboration of some of the primary concerns addressed.
- How can the processes involved in selection of directors be
changed to assure maximizing board effectiveness and
involvement ?
Selection may be the board process that has, or
can have, the most significant influence on board
involvement, objectivity, effectiveness and, as a
result, company performance. Yet, with few exceptions,
it continues to be accomplished by a traditional process
driven more by social than by strategic ramifications.
- How can a director tenure system that, in effect, guarantees
(perhaps "mandates" is more appropriate) long-term board
membership, even when individual performance should dictate
removal of a director, continue to exist in a corporate environment
that increasingly calls out for more organizational flexibility
and corporate responsiveness?
To some degree this may be a by-product of board
protocol - sort of an unwritten code that, once
appointed, asking for a director's resignation,
regardless of his performance, just isn't done. As
stated by more than one of those interviewed "We live
with our mistakes", although they feel this should
change. Unfortunately, this philosophy appears to have
carried over into CEO-succession to some degree, as
evidenced by those boards that become the last to
acknowledge that their CEO's performance has
deteriorated to the point where replacement is critical
to the survival of the firm. Digital Equipment, IBM,
General Motors, West inghouse, and American Express are
highly visible current examples.
- How might networking between directors, boards, and
executives be more effectively utilized to help companies
successfully achieve their strategic objectives ?
These networks, already heavily relied upon by
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corporations, particularly in identification of director
candidates, do not yet appear to have been utilized to even a
fraction of their potential in any of the areas of
strategic importance previously described. For selection
of directors, for instance, the current processes would
require very little change - perhaps as simple as more
specific criteria-specification, and prioritization
based more on expertise than on collegiality . Although
this may require broadening the base from which
candidate recommendations are drawn, there is no reason
the networks that currently exist could not be
effectively utilized in this context.
- To what degree should boards of directors be involved in the
formulation of corporate strategies ?
Although it seems intuitive that the strategy of
any firm should be able to benefit from the broader
range of perspectives inherent in a well-balanced,
strategically-selected board, the answer may be
embedded, instead, in answers to such questions as: "To
what degree is corporate strategy a consideration in the
selection of directors ?", "To what degree is the board
actively involved in guiding the company ?", and "To
what degree does the chairman intend for the board to be
involved ?". Parker (1992) offers an interesting
perspective on the importance of board involvement in
corporate strategy. He suggests the anology that all
companies can be divided into two categories: "day-
sailors" which follow the prevailing winds and return to
their moorings at night; and "ocean-racers" which have a
definite objective and course to follow, competitors to
beat, and are out to win. However, unlike ocean-racing,
for companies there is no race committee to set the
objectives - that responsibility falls to the board. Parker
feels that a board which simply acts as a rubber-stamp
for management's plans instead of actively participating
in strategy formulation comes "dangerously close to day-
sailing" .
Although the list could be extended substantially, these questions seem
to strike at the heart of major issues affecting the performance of boards of
directors, and are offered here more as a guide to areas that may prove
fruitful for further research than to solicit immediate answers. The answers
undoubtedly reside at the source of the questions - the board itself - and
will likely be found only by seeking a deeper understanding of boards and
directors, by examining their perspectives through personal interviews, and by
studying their actions, first-hand.
Strong support for the importance of more direct observation of boards
and directors is offered in Pettigrew's (1992) critical synthesis of research
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on managerial elites. In examining three "often quite separated areas of
intellectual inquiry" (1992: 164), each of which is relevant to this paper, he
describes a common limitation. The research streams are boards of directors,
interlocking directorates, and top management teams. Their shared limitation
is that what boards are supposed to do and what they actually do are discussed
from a variety of perspectives, but findings are almost always based on
analysis of secondary data rather from any inside perspective. Pettigrew
suggests that "Tilting research on managerial elites towards processual
studies on interlocking networks, boards, and top management teams in action
is surely no longer a nice to have, but now an essential" (1992: 177).
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INPUTS
Contingent
variables
Firm - size
- ownership
Industry - type (industrial/service)
- competitiveness
Environment - stable/turbulent
THROUGHPUTS
My research
(The board
configuration]
process)
±
Board Structure
- size (no. of dir's)
- chairmanship (CEO vs outsider)
- committees
- support staff
I
Board's Role - advise
- control
- strategy
OUTPUTS
L
Director Selection
- criteria
- acceptance
- evaluation
1
Board
Composition
I
Director
Networks
Board
Heterogeneity
I I
Board Independence |
I
Board Involvement
IQuality of Debate
IQuality of Strategy
I
Corporate Performance
- profitability
- competitiveness
- reputation
FIGURE 1: BOARD CONFIGURATION PROCESS
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LITERATURE REVIEW
DIRECTOR SELECTION
(Mace, Eaton)
RESEARCH ISSUES
- How (by whom) selected?
- Selection criteria?
How recruited?
Role of strategy?
SURVEY FINDINGS
- Chairman (if CEO)
(varies if chmn
is outsider)
- primarily subjective
(compatibility,
collegiality, etc)
- mostly top people
- some "comers"
- primarily networking
- not evident
- talk of changing to
more expertise-based
selection
(from "cronyism" and
"good-old-boy"
networks )
,
but little evidence
DIRECTOR NETWORKS
(Pfeffer, Burt,
Zahra & Pearce,
Pennings
,
Schoorman, et al)
Implications of
multiple-board service?
dominant force in
director selection
seems "invisible"
to those involved
STRATEGIC ROLES
of the Board
(Andrews,
Zahra & Pearce,
Baysinger & Hoskisson)
What are they, or have
they been?
- What could they be?
- How?
primarily "emergent"
strategies
:
intra- industry
"learning"
inter- industry
cooperation
more deliberate
(planned) strategies:
- strategic alliances
- information &
technology
"mainstreaming"
- boundary spanning
- stakeholder n* working
- environmental
"buffering"
- uncertainty reduction
strategic selection
of directors
TABLE 1: LITERATURE - RESEARCH ISSUES - FINDINGS
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RESPONSIBILITIES: - of the board - as perceived by - the chairman ?
- individual directors ?
- of individual directors - as perceived by:
- the chairman ?
- individual directors ?
COMPOSITION: - inside directors - advantages/disadvantages, as perceived by:
- the chairman ?
- individual directors ?
- outside directors - advantages/disadvantages, as perceived by:
- the chairman ?
- individual directors ?
SELECTION: - how are directors selected ?
- who is responsible for selection ?
- what are the selection criteria ?
- how are candidates identified ?
- how do corporate strategies influence selection ?
- how do memberships on other boards influence selection ?
ACCEPTING
DIRECTORSHIPS: - what are the reasons people agree to serve on boards ?
DIRECTOR NETWORKS: - advantages/disadvantages of serving on more than 1 board:
- to individual directors ?
- to their firms ?
- how do multiple-board memberships influence key strategic
decisions ?
BOARD CHAIRMEN: - advantages/disadvantages of chairman who is an:
- inside director (CEO) ?
- outside director ?
TABLE 2: RESEARCH QUESTIONS
35
CONTROL: - management succession
- management performance evaluation
- management compensation
- balancing management ' s responsibility & authority
ADVISE/COUNSEL: - advise/counsel management
- provide/oversee policy
- assure company's good name/well-being
- provide feedback
- serve as corporate legal entity
STRATEGY: - create/ implement strategy
- analyze/ratify strategic plans/goals
- assure management
' s long-term vision
- assure ongoing corporate purpose
- set direction of company
- anticipate/manage change/uncertainty
- recognize corporate social obligations
- provide public relations
TABLE 3: BOARD RESPONSIBILITIES
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